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Abstract 
There is growing interest in providing multimedia and 
broadband access over satellites.  However there are several 
technical challenges need to be addressed. One challenge is 
security in terms of understanding threats and providing an 
effective security system. Also this paper presents a ULE 
security solution using ULE mandatory extension headers.  
The design issues and choices are discussed.  The detailed 
security header format is described together with processing 
sequence in both transmitter and receiver sides. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There probably exists no other application of satellite 
technology that is as well known as satellite broadcasting [1], 
[2].  The Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) system has been 
designed with a modular structure, based on independent sub-
systems, so that a variety of DVB systems (such as DVB-S: 
satellite, DVB-T: terrestrial, DVB-C: cable) could maintain a 
high level of interoperability.  The challenge for the next 
generation of satellite access systems is to define a common 
basis for efficient integration of satellites in IP-centric 
telecommunication networks. 
ULE has been defined by the IETF IP over DVB working 
group [3] for transmitting IP datagrams over MPEG-2 
Transport Streams. It can be used for transporting of IPv4 
packets, IPv6 packets, and even bridged MAC frames over a 
DVB-S/RCS satellite. This data is encapsulated in a ULE 
Sub-Network Data Unit (SNDU) which is then directly 
placed into the MPEG-2 Transport Stream before 
transmission over the satellite [4].  
Figure 1 shows the packet format for an ULE SNDU. The 
Receiver Destination Network Point of Attachment (NPA) 
address field is optional. The Destination address absent field 
(D) indicates the presence of the destination address field. 
When the destination address is omitted, the DVB receiver 
and gateway may use the embedded layer 3 address (IP 
address in this case) for filtering packets addressed to them. 
The Type field indicates the type of the payload carried by 
the ULE SNDU, for example 0x0800 for IPv4.   
 
IPv4 data
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Figure 1. ULE SNDU format for an IPv4 datagram [4] 
Each SNDU also carries a 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code 
(CRC) field to protect the SNDU from undetected reassembly 
errors and errors introduced in the processing and transit over 
the DVB network [4].  
D=0 NPA AddressLength T1 H1 T2 IP Payload CRC
ULE Base Header
ULE Header Extension  
Figure 2. ULE SNDU packet with header extension [4] 
An extension format for the ULE SNDU has also been 
defined so that new extension headers can be added to the 
ULE SNDU [4]. Figure 2 shows the packet format for an 
ULE SNDU with one extension header, H1. The type field, 
T1 in the ULE base header would specify the type of the 
extension header, while the type T2 in the extension header 
would specify the type of payload carried by the SNDU [4].  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the 
ULE mechanism used for transmitting IP over DVB is 
explained. The ULE packet formats and header extension 
capabilities are also discussed. In Section 3, the threats and 
the security requirements for IP services over DVB are 
discussed. The various security and practical issues arising in 
the design of a security extension for the ULE are discussed 
in detail in Section 4. The new proposed unified ULE 
extension header to provide the various security requirements 
is explained in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are discussed 
in section 6. 
2 THREATS AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
2.1 Threats 
Passive threats are the simplest type of network threat 
possible on any network [5]. This includes eavesdropping 
and traffic analysis (i.e. monitoring of transmissions) with a 
goal to obtain information about the communicating parties 
and other information about the data that is being transmitted.  
In broadcast networks such as DVB that utilise widely 
available low-cost physical layer interfaces, such passive 
threats are a major concern. One example of such a passive 
threat is an intruder monitoring the MPEG-2 transmission 
broadcast and then extracting the data carried within the link. 
Another example is an intruder trying to determine the 
identity of the communicating parties and the volume of their 
traffic by sniffing the layer 2 (and possibly layer 3) addresses. 
While this is a well-known issue when dealing with network 
security, however, it is more of a problem in the case of 
broadcast networks such as MPEG-2 based DVB-S/RCS 
satellite networks because of the easy and wide availability of 
receiver hardware and the large geographical coverage of the 
satellite network. 
Active threats (or attacks) on the other hand are in general 
more difficult to implement successfully than passive threats 
and usually require more sophisticated resources and may 
also require access to the transmitter. Within the context of 
MPEG-2 transmission networks, examples of active attacks 
are: 
• Masquerading: An entity pretends to be a different 
entity.  This includes masquerading other users and 
subnetwork control plane messages. 
• Modification of messages in an unauthorised manner. 
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: When an entity fails to 
perform its proper function or acts in a way that prevents 
other entities from performing their proper functions. 
• Replay attacks: When an intruder sends some old 
(authentic) messages to the receiver. In the case of a 
broadcast link, access to previous broadcast data is easy. 
The active threats mentioned above are major security 
concerns for the Internet community [6]. Masquerading and 
modification of IP packets are comparatively easy in an 
Internet environment, whereas such attacks are in fact much 
harder for DVB-S/RCS satellite broadcast links. Hence, while 
the use of sequence numbers is mandatory in IPsec [7], it 
may not be required all the time for the satellite link. This is 
further reflected in the security requirements for Case 2 and 3 
in Section 3.2 below. 
In a DVB-S/RCS satellite network, the PID associated with 
an Elementary Stream (ES) can be modified for example in 
some systems by reception of an updated SI table, or in other 
systems until the next announcement/discovery data is 
received.  Hence an attacker that is able to modify the content 
of the received multiplex (e.g., replay data and/or control 
information) could inject data locally into the received stream 
with an arbitrary PID value. 
2.2 Threat Cases 
The security threats for DVB-S/RCS satellite can be 
abstracted into the following three cases: 
• Case 1: Passive threat. Here the intruder monitors the 
ULE broadcasts to gain information about the ULE data 
and/or tracking the communicating parties’ identities (by 
monitoring the destination NPA address). In this 
scenario, measures must be taken to protect the ULE 
payload data and the identity of ULE Receivers. 
• Case 2: Locally conducting active attacks on the MPEG-
TS multiplex. Here an intruder is assumed to be 
sufficiently sophisticated to override the original 
transmission from the ULE encapsulation gateway and 
deliver a modified version of the MPEG-TS transmission 
to a single ULE Receiver or a small group of Receivers 
(e.g., in a single company site). The DVB-S/RCS 
satellite network operator might not be aware of such 
attacks. Measures must be taken to ensure ULE data 
integrity and authenticity, and preventing replay of old 
messages. 
• Case 3: Globally conducting active attacks on the 
MPEG-TS multiplex. This assumes a sophisticated 
intruder able to override the whole MPEG-2 
transmission multiplex. The requirements are similar to 
case 2. The MPEG-2 transmission network operator can 
usually identify such attacks and provide corrective 
action to restore the original transmission. 
For both Cases 2 and 3, there can be two sub-cases: 
• Outsider attacks, i.e., active attacks from adversaries 
without knowledge of the secret material. 
• Insider attacks, i.e., active attacks from adversaries 
within the network with knowledge of the secret 
material. 
In terms of priority, Case 1 is considered the major threat in 
DVB-S/RCS satellite systems. Case 2 is considered a lesser 
threat, appropriate to specific network configurations, 
especially when vulnerable to insider attacks. Case 3 is less 
likely to be found in an operational network, and is expected 
to be noticed by the DVB-S/RCS satellite operator. It will 
require restoration of the original transmission. The 
assumption being that physical access to the network 
components (multiplexers, etc.) and/or connecting physical 
media is secure. Therefore, Case 3 is not considered further 
in this paper. 
2.3 Security Requirements for IP over MPEG-2 TS 
From the threat analysis in the above section, the following 
security requirements can be derived: 
• Req 1: Data confidentiality MUST be provided by a link 
that supports ULE Stream Security to prevent passive 
attacks and reduce the risk of active threats. 
• Req 2: Protection of Layer 2 (L2) NPA address is 
OPTIONAL. In broadcast networks, this protection can 
be used to prevent an intruder tracking the identity of 
ULE receivers and the volume of their traffic. 
• Req 3: Integrity protection and source authentication of 
ULE Stream data are OPTIONAL.   
• Req 4: Protection against replay attacks is OPTIONAL. 
• Req 5: L2 ULE Source and Receiver authentication is 
OPTIONAL. This can be performed during the initial 
key exchange and authentication phase, before the ULE 
receiver can join a secure session with the ULE 
Encapsulator (i.e., the ULE source). This could be either 
unidirectional or bidirectional authentication based on 
the underlying key management protocol. 
The following general requirements are also important for all 
threat cases when providing link-layer security for DVB-
S/RCS satellite system: 
• GReq (a): ULE key management functions MUST be 
decoupled from ULE security services such as 
encryption and source authentication. This allows the 
independent development of both systems. 
• GReq (b): Support SHOULD be provided for automated 
as well as manual insertion of keys and policy into the 
relevant databases. 
• GReq (c): Algorithm agility MUST be supported.  It 
should be possible to update the crypto algorithms and 
hashes when they become obsolete without affecting the 
overall security of the system. 
• GReq (d): The security extension header MUST be 
compatible with other ULE extension headers.  The 
method must allow other extension headers (either 
mandatory or optional) to be used in combination with a 
security extension. It is RECOMMENDED that these are 
placed after the security extension header.  This permits 
full protection for all headers.  It also avoids situations 
where the SNDU has to be discarded on processing the 
security extension header, while preceding headers have 
already been evaluated. One exception is the Timestamp 
extension that SHOULD precede the security extension 
header [8]. In this case, the timestamp will be unaffected 
by security services such as data confidentiality and can 
be decoded without the need for key material. 
Examining the threat cases in Section 2.2, the security 
requirements for each case can be summarised as follows: 
• Case 1: Data confidentiality (Req 1) MUST be provided 
to prevent monitoring of the ULE data (such as user 
information and IP addresses). Protection of NPA 
addresses (Req 2) MAY be provided to prevent tracking 
ULE Receivers and their communications. 
• Case 2: In addition to Case 1 requirements, new 
measures MAY be implemented such as authentication 
schemes using Message Authentication Codes, digital 
signatures, or Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant 
Authentication (TESLA) [9] in order to provide integrity 
protection and source authentication (Reqs 3 and 5).  In 
addition, sequence numbers (Req 4) MAY be used to 
protect against replay attacks. In terms of outsider 
attacks, group authentication using Message 
Authentication Codes can provide the required level of 
security (Reqs 3 and 5). This will significantly reduce the 
ability of intruders to successfully inject their own data 
into the MPEG-TS stream. However, scenario 2 threats 
apply only in specific service cases, and therefore 
authentication and protection against replay attacks are 
OPTIONAL. Such measures incur additional 
transmission as well as processing overheads.  Moreover, 
intrusion detection systems may also be needed by the 
MPEG-2 network operator. These should best be coupled 
with perimeter security policy to monitor common DoS 
attacks. 
• Case 3: As stated in Section 2.3, the requirements here 
are similar to Case 2, but since the MPEG-2 transmission 
network operator can usually identify such attacks, the 
constraints on intrusion detections are less than in Case 
2. 
 
Table 1: Security techniques to mitigate network threats  
Table 1 shows the threats that are applicable to ULE 
networks, and the relevant security mechanisms to mitigate 
those threats. 
3 SECURITY EXTENSION DESIGN ISSUES 
This section highlights a number of security and practical 
issues in the design of a security extension for the ULE 
protocol. Many of these issues stem from the requirement of 
identity protection, which is a novelty compared to other 
security protocols known. Other issues arise from network 
architectural properties under which the ULE protocol 
executes. 
3.1 Security Issues 
Applying standard cryptographic and engineering practice is 
insufficient to meet the security goals required for a ULE 
security extension. This is particularly due to the introduction 
of identity protection. Using traffic analysis techniques, a 
passive adversary may be able to link related packets to a 
single connection, potentially enabling him to deduce the real 
destination address, even when precluded from decoding the 
destination NPA address field. Various possible attacks and 
solutions are discussed in the following. 
3.1.1 Address Hiding 
Hiding an SNDU’s real destination NPA address from an 
adversary is arguably the most important step on providing 
identity protection. The use of temporary addresses was 
suggested in [10]. Subsequently, [11] determined a number of 
practical issues, such as the problem of allocating and 
distributing unique temporary addresses within the system. 
From a security point of view, temporary addresses do not 
provide adequate identity protection, as a passive adversary 
may easily link different SNDUs to the same connection. 
By encrypting the destination NPA address within the 
SNDU, an attacker is effectively denied from gaining 
information by monitoring addresses. In [10] it was shown 
that the probability of falsely accepting an SNDU due to 
decryption with the wrong key is very low, and close to 
typical packet-error ratios on the ULE link, while legitimate 
receivers will always be able to correctly decode the 
protected destination NPA address. 
3.1.2 SID Sharing 
The security extension described in this document relies on 
Security Identifiers (SIDs) in the protocol to look up Security 
Associations (SAs) (see section 4.2 on practical issues). Since 
SIDs represent static connection-dependent parameters, they 
are similar in form to temporary addresses. The suggestion in 
[10] therefore was to omit the SID for identity-protected 
SNDUs, and instead use a kind of trial-and-error approach to 
figure out a matching key. This is problematic for several 
reasons: it increases the chance of erroneous acceptance of an 
SNDU; it introduces an element of indeterminism in the 
decoding process; and it assumes the existence of an 
encrypted address field containing pseudo-random data 
irrespective of whether identity protection is used in a 
security extension header or not. 
Instead, a solution could be what we call “SID sharing”. The 
idea is that if different receivers use the same SID value for 
their identity-protected communication, a suitable security 
extension header layout (see section 4.2.2) assures that they 
will not interfere with each other’s communication, while 
identity protection is provided in the sense that an adversary 
can figure out an SNDU’s real destination neither by 
monitoring the encrypted addresses nor by monitoring the 
SID values. 
SID sharing could be enforced either by manual 
configuration, by central configuration via a group controller 
(such as in multicast and unidirectional settings), or by 
selecting SIDs from a pool prioritized for SID sharing. 
3.1.3 Sequence Numbers 
Sequence numbers, frequently used to attain the security goal 
of replay protection, and as nonces for the counter (CTR) 
encryption mode of operation, resemble unkeyed connection 
states that an adversary may track to link packets to different 
connections. It is one of the reasons why we do not mandate 
sequence numbers for our security extension protocol, in 
contrast to IPsec and numerous other security protocols. 
To retain the goal of replay protection, one solution is 
encrypting sequence numbers using standard ECB mode (i.e. 
encrypt as one block of data). A receiver first decrypts the 
blinded value within the protocol to check for a replay, and 
then may use either the encrypted value as an initialization 
vector for the CBC mode of operation, or the decoded 
sequence number for the CTR mode (with the internal 
counter increased by one). The disadvantage is a slightly 
higher protocol overhead compared to un-encoded sequence 
numbers. 
Another solution is to use connection-independent timestamp 
values. Depending on the resolution, timestamps may or may 
not provide perfect replay protection. The drawback is a 
higher protocol overhead, including the need for 
synchronized clocks. 
3.1.4 Stateful Cryptographic Algorithms 
Stateful cryptographic algorithms are problematic for 
manually keyed configurations when devices cannot retain 
their cryptographic states across device restarts (due to power 
or device failures, etc.). Reuse of sequence numbers for the 
CTR mode renders all encryption insecure. Receiver devices 
may be vulnerable to replay attacks if they do not remember 
prior lower bounds for sequence numbers. If devices cannot 
store their cryptographic state in non-volatile memory, it is 
advised that they resort to non-stateful schemes, such as the 
randomized CBC mode for encryption, or the use of 
timestamps for replay protection (if replay protection is 
desired). 
3.1.5 Nonces 
Many stateful schemes, such as the CTR mode of operation, 
require nonces as part of their input. As mentioned before, 
nonces must never be re-used under the same key. To provide 
this guarantee, particularly under group communication 
where the encryption key is shared among several group 
members, some source identifier must be incorporated into 
the construction of the nonce. 
Within ULE networks, the PID may be used as a source 
identifier, but this is not reliable. A device may receive data 
from different MPEG-2 multiplexes, which both may allocate 
PID values independently. Furthermore, multiplexors within 
the network may transparently re-number PID values. This is 
a problem for receivers as they require the originating PID 
value for reconstructing nonces. 
One solution to circumvent these issues is to assign a unique 
sender identifier to each legitimate transmitter under the same 
key [8]. To avoid the problem of associating an MPEG-2 TS 
with a sender identifier, the latter is included explicitly as part 
of the nonce in each SNDU. This means that the nonce field 
(e.g., sequence number) may get enlarged by the size 
necessary to support a predefined maximum number of 
different senders sharing a key. The other caveat of this 
approach is the problem of generating and distributing unique 
sender identifiers. 
3.1.6 Scope of Authentication 
Reliable protection against modification of data and 
masquerading attacks requires both sender and receiver 
identifiers to be authenticated in addition to the payload. This 
is an issue for the ULE protocol because it does not exhibit a 
source identifier field, and the PID of an underlying MPEG-2 
TS cell does not depict a unique and reliable identifier. 
Without authenticating the source, an active attacker may re-
write the PID to appear from a different transmitter under the 
same encryption key. 
Above problems arise only in configurations with multiple 
senders sharing a key, and when PID re-numbering cannot be 
ruled out. Therefore, it seems reasonable to let PID 
authentication be optional, and the PID may be part of a 
pseudo-header for authentication in such case. 
3.2 Practical Issues 
3.2.1 Security Association (SA) Lookup and Re-Keying 
Typically, upon creation of a secure connection, connection 
dependent parameters such as algorithms and key lengths are 
maintained in a state called Security Association (SA) at each 
side. Volatile parameters such as sequence numbers or 
initialization vectors are explicitly provided in the security 
protocol. Frequently, L2 security protocols do not provide 
means to multiplex several secure connections over a link. 
For example, MPE [4] just contains a bitfield indicating 
whether encryption is used or not. Supporting only a single 
SA is justified when a receiver device can directly 
communicate with a master (or base station) solely. However, 
in a meshed network devices may form virtual LANs by 
sharing a SA, and a single device may be part of more than 
one virtual LAN. A Security Identifier (SID) may assist a 
receiver device in looking up the correct SA. This approach, 
taken for example within the IPsec protocols in the form of 
the Security Parameter Index (SPI) [7], also allows for easy 
update of keys (re-keying) by simply switching to a new SA 
with a different SID. On the other hand, protocols not 
supporting a SID must employ one or more key bits to 
indicate a turn-over to new keys. 
The solution presented in this document follows the IPsec 
approach of including a SID in the security extension for SA 
lookup. However, a straightforward use may preclude future 
communication in certain connection scenarios. ULE security 
aims to support connections for which a return channel is not 
available (unidirectional links), or for which use of the return 
link does not scale (multicast). Note that IPsec only supports 
manually keyed multicast settings. The problem is that a 
receiver that failed to receive key update messages will not 
be able to identify future packets with a new SID, and 
therefore ultimately lose connectivity. This is not a problem 
when key bits are used. An earlier suggestion therefore was 
to use such bits in addition to the SID [10]. This raises other 
practical concerns, such as how many key bits to use, and 
where to put these bits in the protocol without introducing 
reserved bits for alignment. Fortunately, the advantages of 
both approaches can be combined very elegantly: instead of 
adding key bits, a SA (via the key management protocol) can 
define a set of two or more SIDs through which are cycled 
whenever a key update occurs. In fact, because the number of 
SIDs need not be pre-defined, the solution is much more 
flexible than using key bits. 
For the ULE security extension header, a SID size of 16 bits 
has been selected. This seems like a good compromise 
between conserving valuable protocol space and providing 
sufficient flexibility. Note that the IPsec protocols’ SPI field 
is much larger with a size of 32 bits; this is justified with the 
fact that these are end-to-end security protocols, potentially 
supporting many different L3 connections, while on L2 users 
are expected to rarely support more than one or a few 
different secure connections. 
3.2.2 Position of the Encrypted Address 
Encryption of the destination NPA address for identity 
protection can be derived directly in the ULE base header. 
This has a couple of disadvantages: hardware address 
filtering for receiver devices supporting identity protection is 
precluded; “legacy” receiver devices (those not supporting 
the security extension) might not be able to filter identity-
protected SNDUs with probability ½ due to the 
multicast/broadcast bit set within the destination NPA 
address; and receiver devices must buffer the encrypted 
address until the security extension header is evaluated. 
The ULE protocol allows omitting the destination NPA 
address in its base header by setting the D bit to one. This 
turns out to be a useful feature for identity protection, as it 
enables moving the encrypted address into the ULE security 
extension header. Besides allowing for a more coherent 
design, and not changing the semantics of the address field, 
the only drawback is that receiver devices accepting SNDUs 
with the D bit set to one will have to evaluate all identity-
protected SNDUs up to the security extension header. When 
receiver processing overhead is an issue, one solution for 
legacy devices is to employ a policy enforcing SNDUs to be 
sent and received with a destination NPA address present. 
Another solution is to refer to connections using identity 
protection as a single multicast group, using the multicast 
group’s address within the ULE base header in addition to a 
receiver’s encrypted address in the security extension header. 
This is particularly useful for GSE where the base header’s 
label type field allows for a 3-byte label format in place of 
the 6-byte address. 
3.2.3 SID Selection 
When identity protection is used for a connection, receivers 
assume the encrypted destination address at a certain position 
within the security extension header, based on the SID value 
found. If the data at that position is not sufficiently random, 
encrypted address decoding errors may not be uniformly 
distributed, and guarantees about low false acceptance rates 
of SNDUs may hence become void. A first step to remedy 
this problem is to keep the encrypted destination NPA 
address at a fixed position in the security extension header, in 
front of the SA-dependent data. Furthermore, SID values for 
identity protection should be strictly separated from those 
used for other secure connections within a network, i.e., there 
should be two pools of SID values, one for SAs with identity 
protection enabled, and one for those without. 
3.2.4 Position of the MAC 
The Message Authentication Code (MAC), while logically 
part of the security extension header, is realized as a trailer to 
the extension header, directly following the PDU. This has 
the advantage of “online” computation, which means that an 
encapsulator can derive the MAC during the process of 
transmitting an SNDU, and as soon as it has finished sending 
the PDU it can simply attach the MAC. This is in similar 
spirit to the CRC, which can also be regarded as a trailer to 
the ULE base header. 
4 SECURITY EXTENSION HEADER FOR ULE 
4.1 Security Extension Header Format 
The proposed security extension shown in Figure 3 aims to 
secure the transmission of user traffic over MPEG-2 
Transport Streams. This security extension is a standard 
extension header as described in Section 5 of RFC 4326 [4] 
and does not affect the ULE base protocol. This security 
extension header is a mandatory ULE extension header. This 
means that a receiver MUST process this header before it 
processes the next extension header or the encapsulated PDU, 
otherwise the entire SNDU should be discarded.  
 
Figure 3: General SNDU format with Security extension 
header 
In Figure 3, the Type field in the base header denotes that a 
mandatory security extension header is present. The receiver 
destination NPA address is optional. After the base ULE 
header the security extension header follows. This header 
contains the ULE-Security-ID, the encrypted destination 
address and the encrypted Next-Type field that denotes the 
type of the enclosed PDU. The higher-layer PDU is 
encrypted and then encapsulated in the SNDU. This is 
followed by the optional SA-Dependant-data field (for 
example, sequence number) and optional Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) field. The format of the 
Destination Address Absent field (D), the Length field the 
Type field and the Receiver Destination NPA address field 
are defined by ULE [4].  
4.1.1 Destination Address absent (D) Field  
The most significant bit of the Length Field carries the value 
of the Destination Address Absent Field (D) as defined by 
ULE [4]. When D is set to 0, it indicates the presence of the 
Destination Address Field while D set to 1 indicates that a 
Destination Address Field is not present.  
4.1.2 Length Field  
A 15-bit Length field denotes the length, in bytes, of the 
SNDU counted from the byte following the Type field, up to 
and including the CRC [4].  
4.1.3 Type Field  
The 16-bit Type field of the ULE base header indicates that a 
security extension header follows subsequently.  
4.1.4 Destination NPA Address Field  
The SNDU Destination Address Field is optional. This field 
MUST be carried when field D is set to 0 and may be omitted 
when D=1 [4].  
4.1.5 ULE-Security-ID Field  
A 32-bit security identifier, the ULE-Security-ID similar to 
the SPI used in IPsec has been added to uniquely identify the 
secure session. This ULE-Security-ID represents the security 
association between the MPEG-2 transmitter and receiver for 
a particular session and indicates the keys and algorithms 
used for encrypting the data payload and calculating the 
MAC. The ULE-Security-ID is used by a receiver to filter 
PDUs in combination with the encrypted destination address.  
4.1.6 Encrypted Destination Address field 
This field is only present if the identity protection service is 
used (determined by the SPs selected). In that case, SNDUs 
do not contain a 48-bit NPA destination address in the ULE 
base header (i.e., they have the D bit set to 1), but the address 
will appear in the security extension header's Encrypted 
Destination Address field instead, where it will be encrypted 
subsequently (along with the payload data). 
4.1.7 SA-Dependant-Data Field  
This optional SA-Dependant-data field may contain any 
information that is specific to the particular SA. An optional 
sequence number may be present in this field to prevent 
replay attacks. The gateway monotonically increments this 
sequence number when it sends a packet to the receiver and 
the receiver verifies the correct sequence number and must 
discard all SNDUs which do not match. If an adversary tries 
to inject or replay old packets the sequence number would 
not match. This would result in discarding the packet. SNDU 
reordering is not permitted on ULE links, and therefore any 
accidental reordering of segments will result in discard. The 
length of the Sequence Number field is defined by the SA. 
Initialisation vectors for decryption purposes may also be 
present in the SA-Dependant-Data field.  
4.1.8 Encrypted Type Field  
This mandatory 16-bit field denotes the type of PDU that is 
encrypted and encapsulated in the Secure ULE SNDU. If 
another ULE extension header follows, then this type field 
indicates the type of this extension header. 
4.1.9 Encrypted SNDU Payload  
To achieve data confidentiality, the traffic between the 
MPEG-2 TS transmitter (i.e. the ULE Encapsulator) and 
receiver needs to be encrypted. The network layer PDUs are 
first encrypted and then encapsulated in the secure ULE 
SNDU. The security associations between the two 
communicating points will describe the algorithms and keys 
used for encryption purposes.  
Secure ULE does not impose the use of any specific 
encryption algorithm and should be able to support the 
commonly used algorithms including AES, 3DES etc.  
4.1.10 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Field  
To provide both data origin authentication and data integrity, 
a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is included in the 
extension header.  
The MAC is calculated over the ULE security extension 
header and the encrypted data payload. The receiver 
calculates the MAC for the each received packet and 
compares it with the transmitted value. The two would not 
match in only 2 cases, firstly either there was an error during 
processing or transmission over the MPEG-2 Network, or 
secondly the packet has not been sent from an authenticated 
entity. In either case, the packet MUST be discarded.  Hence 
the same MAC can be used for data origin authentication and 
to provide data integrity for transmission/processing errors.  
4.2 Transmitter Processing  
The following procedure is followed at the encapsulator for 
processing the security extension header for ULE:  
• Upon reception of the higher layer PDU, the SPD is first 
queried to check the policy to be applied to the PDU. If 
security is needed then an SA must exist in the SAD (this 
is set by the key management system). The security 
parameters (like the encryption keys, the encryption 
algorithm, etc.) are retrieved from the SAD. 
• Now the construction of the ULE SNDU begins. First, the 
header of the base protocol (and other extension headers 
if present) is added to the SNDU. If the SA requests 
identity protection, then the destination NPA address 
MUST be omitted from the base header 
• The ULE-Security-ID for the security association 
between the transmitter and the receiver is added next.  
• The destination address is now encrypted and added to the 
SNDU 
• The SAD is consulted to determine the information that 
has to be added to the SA-Dependant-Data field. If the 
sequence number has to be added, then the corresponding 
sequence number is added to the SNDU.  
• The type field and the higher layer PDU are first 
encrypted using the encryption key and the algorithm as 
indicated in the SAD and then added to the SNDU.  
• The SAD is then checked to determine if the data origin 
authentication and data integrity has to be provided. If 
required, then the MAC has to be calculated. The MAC is 
calculated over the encrypted PDU (and other possible 
extension headers), the Security extension header and the 
secret key. The MAC is then added to the extension 
header in the SNDU.  
• Finally, the CRC is calculated as defined in RFC4326 [4] 
and added to complete the SNDU 
4.3 Receiver Processing  
The following procedure is followed at the receiver for 
processing the security extension header for ULE:  
• Upon reception of a Secure ULE SNDU, the Receiver 
first filters the received packets according to the receiver 
destination NPA address (if present).  
• The CRC is verified as defined in RFC4326 [4].  
• After this the base header and any extension headers up to 
the security extension header are evaluated. 
• The Receiver then uses the ULE-SID to obtain the 
security policy from the SPD and subsequently the 
security associations between the transmitter and receiver 
and retrieve the data from the SAD. The SA is used to 
find the decryption keys and algorithms.  
• Based on the SA, the receiver determines if the MAC is 
present or not. If present the next step would be to check 
the MAC to verify the authenticity and integrity of the 
received PDU.  If the calculated MAC does not match the 
transmitted MAC, then the PDU is discarded.  
• Based on the SA, the receiver determines if the sequence 
number is present or not. If present, it would then use the 
sequence number for filtering any out of-sequence 
packets.  
• The encrypted destination address is decrypted and any 
packets not destined for the receiver are discarded.    
• Finally the encapsulated payload will be decrypted and 
passed to the higher layers for processing.   
5 CONCLUSION 
For effective IP services over DVB satellite networks, a 
security solution must be addressed. This paper has analysed 
a set of threats and security requirements Satellite DVB 
networks and ULE encapsulation of IP traffic.  
Also this paper has presented a ULE security solution using 
ULE mandatory extension headers.  The design issues and 
choices are presented.  The detailed security header format is 
described together with processing sequence in both 
transmitter and receiver sides.  
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